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TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS KPKO UNSC SU SO AF

SUBJECT: U/SYG MALCORRA ON STAFFING, SUDAN, SOMALIA

Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice, for reasons 1.4 b/d.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Rice paid a courtesy call on UN Under-Secretary-General Susana Malcorra on Wednesday, February 11. U/SYG Malcorra, who heads the UN's Department of Field Support (DFS), told the Ambassador that Amcit Tony Banbury was on a "one man shortlist" for the position of Assistant Secretary-General in DFS. She said that an American, Richard Wilcox, was one of several candidates under consideration for the position of deputy chief of the UN mission in Afghanistan and that the Secretariat was open to additional candidates if names could be provided quickly. Malcorra described logistical and force generation challenges facing peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia, and suggested continued informal dialogue to discuss macro-level trends and challenges in peacekeeping. She asked for USG help in reaching out to improve coordination with troop contributing countries (TCCs), particularly South Asians, Nigeria, Ghana and Uruguay. End Summary.

Staffing: A/SYG and Afghanistan

¶2. (C) In an introductory meeting on February 11, U/SYG Malcorra told Ambassador Rice that Amcit Tony Banbury was her preferred candidate for Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Field Support. Malcorra said that she thought highly of Banbury from their time together at the World Food Programme and that he was currently on a "one man shortlist" for the position. Ambassador Rice said that the UN would be hard pressed to find a more qualified candidate.

¶3. (C) Rice told Malcorra that the U.S. would also be interested in seeing a strong American Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (D/SRSG) of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Malcorra responded that panel review for the position was already underway, with at least one Amcit candidate, Richard Wilcox, on the shortlist. She said that additional names could be considered if the USG wished to propose them, but that "we should move quickly" if this were the case. Malcorra also indicated an openness to considering USG candidates for four vacant director-level positions in her department: human resources, logistics, IT and finance.

Sudan

¶4. (C) Malcorra said that, despite the best efforts of the UN and previous statements by SYG Ban, full deployment of UNAMID would not be possible by mid-year. Current troop commitments could bring the mission to nearly 80% of full deployment by March, but without new pledges a 20% gap would remain, she said. The U/SYG said that it was important to focus on

capabilities as well as quantitative deployment numbers: according to UN military experts, the lack of enablers, equipment and training meant UNAMID's current capabilities were below 50% of the planned level, despite having deployed more than 63% of envisioned forces. Malcorra said that training and equipment of forces on the ground was improving thanks to bilateral USG and other efforts, but that the UN was "far behind" in securing enabling assets. She reported that the UN would accept Ethiopia's offer of helicopters despite their lack of night vision capability, but that she did not expect additional offers of helicopters to be forthcoming.

¶ 15. (C) Malcorra briefed Ambassador Rice on her plans to travel next week to the fourth tripartite (UN-AU-GoS) meeting on UNAMID, where the impending decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on issuance of an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Bashir would be discussed. At the last meeting, the GoS promised Malcorra that it was committed to protecting UN personnel in the wake of an ICC decision, but claimed that it could not prevent "spontaneous" protests from the population. In response to a question from Ambassador Rice on the efficacy of UNAMID's hybrid model, Malcorra acknowledged that it was "a different animal" that "could not be recommended anywhere else" and that created particular difficulties for DPKO. From DFS's point of view, Malcorra said she was often able to make tripartite coordination work by using the AU as a conduit to channel requests to the Sudanese government. She added that effective peacekeeping in Sudan was made more difficult by the requirement, mandated by the status of forces agreement, to maintain two separate supply chains for UNAMID and UNMIS. Such an arrangement was

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inherently inefficient, Malcorra said, and required the UN to maintain separate camps in El Obeid in order to store equipment for the two missions separately.

Somalia

¶ 16. (C) Malcorra said that as DFS prepared for a February 12 briefing to the Security Council on logistical support to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), she was concerned that the proposal might not find buy-in from the Fifth Committee. She said that early feedback from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) was negative, with many feeling that the Security Council had overstepped its bounds and that the proposal would be "a tough sell." Malcorra said that she expected African delegations to support the package in the Fifth Committee, but that Latin American and Asian delegations were more skeptical. Malcorra agreed with Ambassador Rice that developing countries' concern over the cost of peacekeeping operations was largely due to a perceived lack of balance between peacekeeping and other priorities, such as development. DFS was attempting to partially address these concerns, Malcorra said, by attempting to source and recruit locally wherever possible.

¶ 17. (C) Ambassador Rice told Malcorra that the USG was working on a positive response to the UN's request for a 607 agreement, and would work with the UN to push the UN support package through the Fifth Committee. Malcorra appreciated U.S. assistance, and asked that existing USG arrangements to provide logistical support to AMISOM and train and equip additional Ugandan and Burundian battalions remain in place. After these units deployed, Malcorra said that "the UN will do the seventh, eighth and ninth battalions," which she hoped would come from Nigeria and possibly Togo.

Peacekeeping challenges

¶ 18. (C) Malcorra lamented that the crisis-oriented nature of peacekeeping management left little time to discuss broader

trends and challenges facing peacekeeping. She suggested that the UN, U.S. and other stakeholders seek out opportunities to pursue such a discussion in an informal setting. Malcorra mentioned technology as an area where peacekeeping capabilities needed to improve, noting that MONUC troops in DRC don't have relatively simple tactical capabilities, such as the ability to jam cell phones. Acknowledging that intelligence remained "a dirty word" in the UN system, Malcorra nevertheless insisted that without increased surveillance and other technological capabilities, UN troops would never be able to exert control over a territory as vast as that of the DRC.

¶9. (C) Malcorra expressed a personal view that peacekeeping in Islamic environments was a quickly emerging thematic challenge that had not been sufficiently addressed. She suspected that this dynamic had helped dissuade traditional troop contributing countries such as Pakistan, Turkey and India from responding to the Secretary-General's call to deploy a multi-national force to Somalia. "Going to Somalia brings you trouble at home," she said, alluding to the possibility of domestic political opposition, radicalization or terrorist attacks, "so why bother?"

¶10. (C) The U/SYG said that the gap in coordination between TCCs and SC members was another challenge to effective peacekeeping. She said that TCCs needed to feel they had a seat at the table and encouraged the U.S. to serve as a bridge between troop contributors and the Council. Malcorra singled out Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana and Uruguay as TCCs that might be favorably disposed to U.S. outreach.

Rice